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Salutation  
It is again a pleasure for me to be here at Covenant University. This place is fast becoming a 
home for me in intellectual terms. I have always looked forward to returning here because I am 
now certain of the unfolding of significant institutional/educational dynamics that have the 
potentials to impact the rethinking of Nigeria’s educational framework I have been championing 
for a while now. Education is critical to democratic consolidation and to sustainable 
development. This is because democracy and development require a solid mass of human capital 
that could carry the burden of transforming Nigeria by turning the two concepts into concrete 
programmes of democratic renewal and reconstruction.  
I am particularly happy to be among the thematic guest speakers at this important 
conference. Issues like this are particularly dear to my heart, and are in consonance with my 
many years of crusading for a national reform philosophy that would jumpstart national 
development through an institutional rearticulation of Nigeria’s national project. This 
Conference therefore becomes a really auspicious context within which we can all brainstorm 
around the issues of potentials, possibilities and problems. We really need to ask serious and 
disturbing questions why various African states that have been struggling, since independence, 
have been unable to find the right combination of elements that would translate into a truly 
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sustainable development around which we can sincerely say we have decolonized after the 
horrors of colonialism.  
I am heartened by the arrays of thematic issues that would be flagging off this 
conference. Food security, gender, knowledge economy, entrepreneurship, health, environment, 
infrastructure, technology—all these are current issues that speak to the future of Africa. But as 
we all know, all these elements need to be woven into a pragmatic dynamics of implementable 
policies for us to achieve a commendable and sustainable development. I sincerely hope this 
conference will become a milestone in that regard. 
Introduction: Is Africa really rising? 
Since the late 90s, most African states have had to come to term with the wave of democracy that 
blew across the continent.This was significant because Africa has had to contend with many 
states battling with all forms of authoritarian political disorder and its consequences. From 
Algeria and Burkina Faso to Sierra Leone and Liberia to Sudan and Ethiopia to DR Congo and 
Uganda, most African countries have had to contend with all forms of political regimes from one 
party state to the military regimes. All these represent the unfortunate symptoms of the colonial 
dislocations that pre-empted the postcolonial realities on the continent. In essence, the liberation 
that the African nationalists—Nkrumah, Kenyatta, Mandela, Azikiwe, Lumumba, Nasser, Toure, 
etc.—fought for did not lead to any development dividend which could have made Africa better 
in postcolonial times than during colonialism. The promises of the nationalists that all will 
become well once the colonialists have left did not materialise.  
Democracy and development therefore offer a radical hope of a transformation that could 
effectively make Africans better off than they have been before now. In the political science 
literature, there is a debate about the relationship between democracy and development. Anna 
Lekvall summarised the discourse into three camps of arguments:  
(a) the democratic governance camp, which stresses the importance of democratic 
governance for development; (b) the developmental state camp, which believes 
that the developmental state comes first and democracy later; and (c) the multiple 
path camp, which emphasizes politics but also highly context-specific paths to 
development (2013: 27). 
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These three camps deploy powerful argument on the priority of either democracy or 
development or a mixture of the two. In the first camp, democracy provides a suitable context 
within which development evolves and delivers the goods to the citizens. The second camp has 
the strong evidence of the centralized developmental states of Asia—Taiwan, South Korea, 
Singapore, etc.—as a veritable example of how development trumps democracy in terms of rapid 
economic growth and transformation. And the third camp makes a reasonable claim about the 
context-specificity of any political strategy or institutions.  
 As a reform expert, the arguments of the second development camp have obvious appeal 
to me. In fact, a bulk of my writings has been dedicated to the exigency of evolving a 
developmental state in Africa, and especially Nigeria. Being a former civil servant, I see the 
significance of an autonomous, capacitated and committed bureaucracy as part of a larger 
centralized decision-making institution committed to development planning. But then, that bias 
must be subjected to a larger argument of peculiarity and possibility. In the final analysis, given 
that any mono-causal stands the risk of neglecting important variables, we must conclude that 
progress must be a function of democracy, development and political ingenuity that leads to a 
normative governance framework Africans can call ‘good’. And here we confront a significant 
point, projected powerfully by our thematic topic today: good governance is a mirage outside 
those democratic values of accountability and transparency. 
 In recent years, African governments seem to have woken up to the democratic urging to 
open up the governance space and improve economic participation. We have had the Lagos Plan 
of Action, The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer 
Review Mechanism (APRM) as institutional dynamics to monitor governance relationship 
between the government and the governed in Africa. The result is what scholars and global 
organisations have called the ‘Africa Rising’ phenomenon, a situation in which many economies 
in Africa—Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Zambia, Uganda, 
Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Tanzania, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Kenya, etc.—were achieving above 7.0% 
economic growth. Since this is about the first time in postcolonial temporal reckoning that this 
kind of economic achievement has been reached, then optimism and euphoria must be balanced 
by rigorous policy initiative and political dexterity. In theoretical terms, Herbst and Mills call 
this ‘Africa Rising’ phenomenon ‘Africa’s third liberation’.  
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 Africa’s first liberation was from colonial exploitation. This is what Kwame Nkrumah 
considered as ‘seeking the political kingdom’. But it soon became clear, even in Nkrumah’s 
Ghana, that ‘every other thing’ would not follow that first liberation automatically. Africa had to 
contend with its very own liberators who took over the colonial institutions and reinvented them 
as autocratic machineries of domination and primitive accumulation. The second liberation, in 
tandem with the democratic consolidation on the continent, therefore has to do with the 
uprooting of all forms of autocratic regime. On the other hand, according to Herbst and Mills, 
Africa’s political evolution points to a third liberation that most of the continent 
has yet to experience, one that will likely prove as important as the political 
freedoms earned over the past half century, or perhaps even more important: the 
liberation from political economies characterised by graft, crony capitalism, rent-
seeking, elitism and, inevitably, widening (and destabilising) social inequality. 
Such an emancipation is necessary to open up economic space in which business 
can compete, a necessary condition to expand employment (2012). 
 The optimism backing this emancipatory thinking about Africa’s possibility in the 21st 
century is premised on three elements that give Africa an enormous edge in developmental 
terms—a human capital strength grounded in Africa’s youthful and highly educated population; 
a rapidly evolving and entrepreneurial private sector; and an enormous natural resource base.The 
challenge is therefore straightforward: Can African states convert their ongoing economic 
momentum into governance frameworks for defeating unemployment, poverty and the 
infrastructural deficit that plagues the continent? 
Institutions and the curse of underdevelopment; A comparative analysis 
From all empirical evidence available, the answer appears negative. And this is where we 
confront a paradox in Africa’s political economies: Africa seems to be rising while still starkly 
underdeveloped. Africa is still third and not first world; Cameroon is still very far from 
Indonesia, and Ghana still lacks the governance stature of Malaysia. In comparative terms, how 
was it possible for Singapore and Nigeria, two erstwhile third world countries, to be so different 
in the space of thirty years? What explains the extraordinary difference in development level 
between the two countries? 
 Acemoglu and Robinson have an answer that ought to be taken seriously. But the 
effectiveness of that answer requires that they first displaced the cogency of the geography, 
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culture and ignorance hypotheses. The culture hypothesis, for instance, claims that the difference 
between the rich and poor nations of the world is a function of the kinds of cultural values—
beliefs, values and ethics—that underlie those different societies. Max Weber’s argument is 
representative of this hypothesis. In other words, the Protestant work ethic in the Western society 
says a lot about progress in those societies where profligacy, superstition and laziness undermine 
productive work. Acemoglu and Robinson therefore ask: 
Is the culture hypothesis useful for understanding world inequality? Yes and no. 
Yes, in the sense that social norms, which are related to culture, matter and can be 
hard to change, and they also sometimes support institutional differences, this 
book’s explanation for world inequality. But mostly no, because those aspects of 
culture often emphasized—religion, national ethics, African or Latin values—are 
just not important for understanding how we got here and why the inequalities in 
the world persist. Other aspects, such as the extent to which people trust each 
other or are able to cooperate, are important but they are mostly an outcome of 
institutions, not an independent cause. 
For them, institutions constitute the single most significant argument anyone can make for the 
huge difference that occurred over time between Singapore and Nigeria that used to have the 
same GDP per capita some 30 years ago, and the huge leap that Singapore has made from third 
world to first while leaving Nigeria embroiled in the same predicament it has been since 
independence. Put in other words: “Countries differ in their economic success because of their 
different institutions, the rules influencing how the economy works, and the incentives that 
motivate people”. The economic difference between prosperity and poverty is grounded in the 
essential quality between the extractive and the inclusive political institutions that dominate the 
economic development profile of the country.  
 Political institutions are inclusive when they allow a broad spectrum of the citizens to 
participate in the formulation and implementation of the rules by which the society is to be 
guided. These institutions also allow the citizens wide enough participation in entrepreneurial 
economic activities that facilitate the display of their skills and creativity which add value to the 
overall economic profile of the state. On the other hand, the extractive economic and political 
institutions allow a few elite formations to extract the available resources from the rest of society 
and in the service of narrow interests. Thus, 
Political and economic institutions, which are ultimately the choice of society, can 
be inclusive and encourage economic growth. Or they can be extractive and 
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become impediments to economic growth. Nations fail when they have extractive 
economic institutions, supported by extractive political institutions that impede 
and even block economic growth. But this means that the choice of institutions—
that is, the politics of institutions—is central to our quest for understanding the 
reasons for the success and failure of nations. We have to understand why the 
politics of some societies lead to inclusive institutions that foster economic 
growth, while the politics of the vast majority of societies throughout history has 
led, and still leads today, to extractive institutions that hamper economic growth 
There is no doubt that the institution hypothesis is central to the understanding of Africa’s third 
liberation. If the rhetoric of ‘Africa Rising’ must be squared with the evidence of gross 
underdevelopment in terms of literacy, poverty, inflation, income inequality, gender imbalance 
and unemployment, then we need a deep understanding of how Africa’s basic institutional 
dynamics have remained essentially extractive, and its political orientation has remained 
patrimonial.  
 Africa’s terrible postcolonial trajectory began immediately after independence with a 
statist political dogma inherited from the framework of the colonial state in Africa. The colonial 
state was perforce a violent state devoid of any of the positive, legitimizing mutual links and 
reciprocal dynamics of rights and obligations between state and society. The transition from the 
colonial to the post-colonial stateoccasioned, to a large extent, a direct carry-over and 
continuation of colonial attitudes, values and modus operandi by Africa’s nationalist elite. This 
inevitable consequence of this transition was the evolution of an authoritarian and centralized 
control over the polity and the eventual stifling of any democratic tendency.It is not therefore 
surprising that the immediate post-independence period was marred by the one-party ideology 
and the scourge of military rule which lasted well into the 90s.  
The result of this approach is not only to stifle all opposition and the opportunity for more 
viable alternatives to development, it has also meant the use of the bureaucracy as a means of 
political intervention in the economy and society, thereby compromising its neutrality, 
impartiality and anonymity. In addition, it strengthens the bureaucracy’s power vis-à-vis other 
institutions, and also renders it immune from accountability, whether from the people or their 
representatives. A politicized bureaucracythat loses its neutrality and impartiality becomes 
dysfunctional in terms of having a highly compromised capacity to rationally and efficiently 
allocate resources for development purposes. 
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We therefore have a statement of how the institutions dominating the political and 
economic landscape of most African states were already compromised in terms of how the rules 
of the budding African states would be made, and in whose interests. Furthermore, the 
patrimonial nature of the operation of these institutions ensures that they would be essentially 
extractive rather than inclusive. The reason for their non-inclusive nature is to be found squarely 
within the euphoria-induced neglect of the political leadership. Let me explain. The abundant 
literature on anticolonialism and nationalist protests against colonialism points at a vigorous 
attempt by the nationalist elites to wrest power away from the colonizers in other to establish a 
continental wide reconstruction of the national spaces of the African states. Unfortunately, once 
political independence was achieved, it became the gateway not to an unfolding template of 
emancipatory politics but rather a path to untold postcolonial socioeconomic anomie and 
deprivation of all forms. The simple reason is the unwillingness of the nationalist elites to 
deconstruct the state and its apparatuses which colonialism left behind as a ‘legacy’.  
In ‘A Cultural Typology of Economic Development,’ Grondona explains this elite failure 
in terms of the temptations that the leadership falls into when the process of economic 
development proceeds from one critical stage to another. Economic progress is therefore 
explainable in terms of the political will to overcome the temptation or fall into it. According to 
Grondona, 
When the cycle starting with labor and endingin reinvestment has yieldedsome 
fruit and people feel richer, they may be inclined to work less. On theother hand, 
consumption may rise at a pace that reduces the surplus, so thatdevelopment turns 
into enrichment. Furthermore, even if the surplus is increased,a nation may decide 
not to return it to productive investment. It mayinstead spend it on those priorities 
to which nations have often surrendered,such as works that are monuments to 
leaders, wars of prestige, utopian plansof welfare, or outright corruption. Nations 
may also be tempted to preservetheir stage of development through protectionist 
strategies or policies thatdiscourage entrepreneurship and investment (2000: 44). 
 
This understanding of the relationship between the elite behaviour and the trajectory of national 
progress enables us to see economic development essentially ‘as an unending sequence of 
decisions favorable to investment, competition,and innovation that are made whenever the 
temptationto diverge arises’ (44). And such a decisional strength to overcome temptation is made 
possible, according to Grondona, if elite behaviour is conditioned by cultural values and attitudes 
that are conducive to development and prosperity.  
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He develops twenty cultural factors with two contrasting poles that could facilitate 
economic development or resist it: religion (whether it is ‘publican’, favours the poor and 
therefore resists development or it is pharisaic’, favours the rich and hence promotes incentive 
for investment); trust/mistrust in individual’s entrepreneurial creativity; moral imperative 
(whether the citizens comply with the laws and normsor operate in a ‘real world of furtive 
immorality’); wealth (whether it consists of what exists—land, or what does not yet exist—
innovation); competition (whether it is condemned or accepted as the key to excellence); justice 
(as concerned with the present alone or with future generation); value of work; attitude to 
doubt/heresy; the role of education (as innovative or brainwashing); the significance of utility(the 
practical or the theoretical); lesser virtues (the difference between tidiness, courtesy, punctuality 
and love, justice, courage); time focus (the worship of the past or the control of the immediate 
future); rationality (the difference between smaller achievements and grandiose planning); 
authority(whether power resides in the law or in individuals); worldview (the world as setting for 
action or the search for utopia); life view (does life happen to me or I am the chief protagonist in 
life’s drama?); salvation (escape the world or transform it); utopianism (is utopia nearby or 
beyond reach); optimism (due to personal effort or the gods); democracy (absolutist or liberal).  
It is easy to calculate the type of values that predominate in most African societies from 
this typology. However, the most damning conclusion to draw is that we have an insight into a 
set of cultural attitude and ethos that has not only undermined the process of institutionalisation 
in postcolonial Africa but has equally slowed the process of economic growth. In the nex section, 
we will tie some of the comparative issues raised here together into a template for rethinking the 
idea of democratic governance on the one hand, and the relationship between culture and 
institutions as the engine of economic development on the other. 
 
Democracy and the governance paradigm 
Governance is essentially about how decisions are made in the very act of governing, especially 
among state and non-stat actors which are involved in setting the rules of engagement and the 
policies for making the society and its institutions work. Governance therefore involves the 
totality of the manner in which the norms and values, regulations and rules, policies, procedures 
and processes, and actions are established, implemented, sustained, evaluated and held 
accountable. In shorthand,  
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Governance refers to the exercise of political and administrative authority at all 
levels to manage a country’s affairs. It comprises the mechanisms, processes and 
institutions, through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise 
their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences (UN. 2012: 
3).  
 Traditionally, the governance responsibility was conceived in terms of the government’s 
overall ‘commanding height’ political control over thewhole of society and its various 
constituents. Specifically, traditional governance concerns how the government goes about the 
process of delivering public services to its citizens in a manner that is efficient and effective and 
would make their lives meaningful. However, by the 80s and 90s, there was already considerable 
unease about the capacity of the modern state, standing alone, to entirely oversee the policy 
making processes and facilitate efficient and effective service delivery to the populace. The ‘new 
governance’ agenda therefore led to a redefinition of the role of the state as well as the expansion 
of the governance space to admit more non-state and non-elected actors, markets, networks and 
partnerships in policy processes and service delivery. Thus,  
The increased role of nonstate actors inthe delivery of public services has led to a 
concernto improve the ability of the state to oversee theseother actors. The state 
has become more interestedin various strategies for creating and managing 
networksand partnerships. It has set up all kinds ofarrangements for auditing and 
regulating other organizations.In the eyes of many observers, there hasbeen an 
audit explosion. In addition, the increasedrole of nonelected actors in policy 
making suggeststhat we need to think about the extent to which wewant to hold 
them democratically accountable andabout the mechanisms by which we might do 
so (Bevir, 2007: 365). 
 
The idea of ‘good governance’ ties the issues of democracy, development and 
governance together. It implies a normative understanding of the social contract between the 
government and the citizens that insists that any decision made on behalf of the people must be 
such that leads, in the final analysis, to the betterment and empowerment of the citizens. 
Governance is ‘good’ to the extent that the policy making processes and the institutions are 
transparent, accountable in a manner that promote such democratic norms and values like 
pluralism, accountability, participation, rule of law, equality, etc. It is very easy to see how the 
good governance dynamics facilitate development. When the institutions of any state are 
grounded on democratic tenets and ethos, it becomes smoother to facilitate the tackling of 
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development problems like poverty, unemployment, income/gender inequality, environmental 
degradation, insecurity, etc.  
The good governance dynamics therefore draws attention to three pertinent issues. The 
first concerns the framework of political and bureaucratic corruption which is the singular most 
potent force that undermines the governance dynamics. The second is the urgent need to monitor 
the governance space with its various non-state actors and hence its thin line of accountability. 
The last issue has to do with the institutional basis for ensuring that good governance remains an 
enduring framework for grounding sustainable development. The new institutionalism, for 
instance, provides a viable theoretical matrix that enables us an understanding of institutions 
within the context of cultural norms and formal procedures and rules. The pertinent questions 
are: How do cultural values, habits and attitudes shape individual institutions and institutional 
behaviour? How ought institutions to evolve in ways that would reshape resistant cultural 
attitudes and values and engender development?  
The United Nations Development Program has outlined eight criteria for identifying good 
governance. First, there is an open playing field for participation in the decision making 
processes in the state. Second, a state must build trust and responsiveness that ensure that the 
needs of the citizens are adequately addressed at reasonable times. Third, good governance, 
especially within the context of the plural states in Africa, requires that such states must always 
seek fair means by which differences—ethnicity, religion, language, class and gender—can be 
mediated with a mind towards consensus and consistency. Fourth, good governance 
fundamentally implies accountability. A state must be accountable to those affected by the 
decisions made and the policies implemented. Fifth, and as a corollary of the fourth, 
accountability presumes transparency. This simply means that the stat must always strive to 
make the decision making processes as open as possible so that those affected would be given 
the understanding of what government is doing and why. Transparency requires that government 
must always justify its decisions and actions to its citizens. Sixth, good governance also requires 
that the various institutions involved in the decision making processes must operate by legally 
binding frameworks that are fair, impartial and incorruptible. Seventh, there must also be a 
system of visioning in place that ensures that good governance is backstopped by a process of 
development continuity in economic and social terms. And eight, the fundamental objective of 
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good governance is to guarantee the rights of individuals while improving their well-being in a 
manner that is inclusive and participatory. Anything other than these eight principles can only be 
bad governance. 
I hypothesize that the breakthrough for African development lies in our capacity to 
facilitate a unique relationship between democratic consolidation and institutional stability. Let 
me put it another way. Good governance can only become viable if we can locate its 
sustainability within two seemingly contradictory truths: On the one hand, cultural frameworks 
have the capacity to shape the political and economic behaviour, as well as the democratic 
institutions, of the society. On the other hand, institutional consolidation in any society is 
essentially significant for undermining cultural traditions.  
In the last part of this paper, I will discuss how these variables factor into Nigeria’s 
national development, especially within the change paradigm of the present administration. I 
expect that the conclusions I will be drawing within the Nigerian political experiment would 
resonate with a larger continental implications that could enable us make some significant 
developmental progress. 
Democracy is productivity is development: Change and its contents 
Nigeria holds a lot of fascination and significance for Africa. When recently in 2013, Nigeria 
rebased it Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from $270 billion to $510 billion, the more than 90% 
increase confirmed its economic strength and size over most other African states. Nigeria also 
wields a demographic advantage as the most populous country in Africa, and hence the one with 
the most potential to convert the entrepreneurial energies of its youthful population into a solid 
economic capital. Unfortunately, Nigeria’s foreign relation slogan of being ‘the giant of Africa’ 
lost its appeal within the context of her gross inability to convert her comparative advantages to 
socioeconomic national strength. For instance, apart from the economic and demographic 
strength, Nigeria is also considered the corrupt and the most religious country in Africa.  
 Like most African countries, Nigerians feel these contradictions more at the level of local 
socioeconomic realities in terms of political listlessness, infrastructural deficit, institutional 
underperformance and economic underdevelopment. Nigerians are daily confronted with 
national insecurity (Boko Haram insurgency/the marauding of Fulani herdsmen), extreme 
38
3rd International Conference on African Development Issues (CU-ICADI 2016)
ISSN:2449-075X
Copyright © 2016 by Covenant University Press
poverty, monumental youth and general unemployment, gender inequality, galloping illiteracy, 
etc. it is for these reasons that the Buhari Administration and its change slogan carry a lot of 
political resonance amongst Nigerians. According to popular opinion and scholarly analysis, it 
seems that this is the closest that Nigeria has ever come to a genuine transformation of its 
development profile since independence.  
 But after more than a year into its existence, it seems that the PMB administration is 
gradually losing its goodwill to engender a lasting paradigmatic change in Nigeria. This could be 
due to the intemperate expectations of Nigerians waiting for so long for betterment. Or, it could 
be a genuine assessment of another administrative failure in a long list of others since 
independence. The fundamental question is: How does real change translate into a real paradigm 
shift in terms of democratic governance and development? There are many layers to unearth in 
Nigeria’s sociocultural and socioeconomic history before one can ever hope to adequately 
answer this question. A good place to start, however, is to excavate the link between the success 
of democratic governance and the unenviably low productivity profile that stagnate Nigeria’s 
economic progress.  
 It is to be expected, with all empirical evidences, that when democracy inflects the 
governance dynamics of a state, the impact is felt by the extent to which the democratic 
institutions impede the corrupt actions of state officials and politicians. The reduction in 
corruption, again to be expected, leads to increase in productivity, technological advancement 
and economic development. This is not a seamless transition as Nigeria and many African states 
prove. Nigeria’s institutional dynamics is still in the throes of maturation, and hence still 
grappling with the necessity of imbibing democratic stability doses that would strengthen it 
against negative cultural values. According to the World Economic Forum Global Competitive 
Index for 2015-2016, South Africa ranked 49 with a 4.4 value while Nigeria ranked 124, out of 
140 states, with a value of 3.5. The GCI provides deep insight into the drivers of productivity and 
prosperity.  
 This ranking of 124 actually represents an improvement of three positions from 127 in 
the 2014-2015 ranking. This was due to  
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an increase in market size (up by eight places to 25th), lower government deficit 
and debt, and decreased national savings. Improvements in property rights, the 
efficiency of the legal framework to settle and challenge disputes, and the 
accountability of the private sectoran increase in market size (up by eight places 
to 25th), lower government deficit and debt, and decreased national savings. 
Improvements in property rights, the efficiency of the legal framework to settle 
and challenge disputes, and the accountability of the private sectorlift the 
country’s institutions up by five places, albeit remaining low overall (124th) 
(WEF, 2016). 
 
 
Info Rank / 140 Score 
   
 Global Competitiveness 
Index 1-7 (best)  124 3.5    
 Sub-index A: Basic requirements 1-7 (best) 
 
136 3.2 
   
1st pillar: Institutions 1-7 (best) 
 
124 3.2 
   
2nd pillar: Infrastructure 1-7 (best) 
 
133 2.1 
   
3rd pillar: Macroeconomic environment 1-7 
(best)  
81 4.6 
   
4th pillar: Health and primary education 1-7 
(best)  
140 2.9 
   
 Sub-index B: Efficiency enhancers 1-7 (best) 
 
81 3.9 
   
5th pillar: Higher education and training 1-
7 (best)  
128 2.8 
   
6th pillar: Goods market efficiency 1-7 
(best)  
100 4.1 
   
7th pillar: Labor market efficiency 1-7 
(best)  
35 4.5 
   
8th pillar: Financial market development 1-
 
79 3.8 
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Info Rank / 140 Score 
   
7 (best) 
9th pillar: Technological readiness 1-7 
(best)  
106 3.0 
   
10th pillar: Market size 1-7 (best) 
 
25 5.1 
   
 Sub-index C: Innovation and sophistication 
factors 1-7 (best)  
114 3.2 
   
11th pillar: Business sophistication 1-7 
(best)  
94 3.7 
   
12th pillar: Innovation 1-7 (best) 
 
117 2.8    
 
However, in all the 12 pillars measuring productivity, Nigeria’s performance was still dismally 
low overall. And the situation is more precarious now because of the current fiscal crisis 
occasioned by the global oil recession which has led to dwindling revenue base for the 
government.  
 So, change must work. But, there is no chance to make that happen in a sequential 
manner. The struggle to consolidate democracymust be simultaneous with the effort to entrench 
a sustainable productivity paradigm as the basis of a new social contract with Nigerians based on 
sincerity, trust, transparency and accountability. How then can the PMB change narrative be 
turned radically into a game changer in the democracy-governance-development dynamics in 
Nigeria? I have three fundamental suggestions that, I believe, have deep implications for other 
African countries. 
  What seems most immediate is the need for a productivity model that would not only 
address Nigeria’s dwindling revenue base and the enormous cost of governance, but 
also seek to leverage the efficient productive framework that would enable us to 
produce more with less. The productivity exigency also requires a comprehensive 
reform package that would speak critically to the capacity readiness of the public 
service system to backstop government policy execution and management. This is 
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because good governance and its democratic components must necessarily lead to the 
stimulation of administrative reforms that improve government capacity to affect its 
citizens’ lives. For instance, without optimally functional MDAs, there is no hope that 
any state would ever achieve a productive level that can serve as the governance basis 
for democracy to function in a manner that can qualitatively improve the lives of the 
citizens. 
 
     At the other end of the institutional renewal and reconstructive national surgery is the 
need for a wide-spread reorientation of national values as the basis by which any state 
can reengineer its fundamental institutions. Etounga-Manguelle calls this a ‘cultural 
adjustment program’ which involves infusing institutions with those African humanistic 
values—solidarity, social interaction, love of neighbours, care for the environment, etc. 
(2000: 75). The cultural adjustment program, according to Etounga-Manguelle, must 
begin urgently in four significant sectors: education, economics, politics and social life. 
For instance, an educational reform must find a way to achieve a curricula that promote 
a discursive collaboration between science, technology, engineering and mathematics 
(STEM) and the humanities and social sciences (HSS). Education is also very 
significant as the bedrock for the establishment of development-friendly values—
meritocracy, civility, patriotism, critical thinking, creativity and imaginativeness, 
respect for differences in terms of religion, gender, culture, etc.  
 
In this wise, there is a crucial need, within Nigeria, to reform the National Orientation 
Agency (NOA), the organisation saddled with the task of value awareness and 
rearticulation. To all intents and purposes, NOA is presently nothing more than a 
pedestrian organisation without any national clout. A deep reform of its organisational 
strength will involve elevating the agency’s operational capacity in a way that enables it 
to deploy research tools towards creating some value and attitudes guidelines and 
practical initiatives that could be integrated into development policies, planning and 
programmes. The objective of value reorientation Nigeria requires for achieving 
development is huge, and NOA is barely even managing to scratch its surface. The 
objective is simple but fundamental: the gradual but steady evolution of a new mental 
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model that shifts focus away from the culture of patronage to meritocracy, from short-
term to long-term considerations, from indolence to hard work, from certificated 
illiteracy to reflective practices and skills orientation, from profligacy and rabid 
consumerism to an investment mentality, etc.   
 
The possibility of achieving this translates into a genuine collaboration between NOA 
and (a) the ministry of education, (b) the National Universities Commission (NUC) and 
all Nigerian universities, (c) the Nigerian judicial system which could backstop the 
incentivization and justiciability of the values and attitudes Nigeria wants to inculcate in 
its citizens.  
 
  Africa’s institutional renewal must be accompanied simultaneously by the deliberate 
manufacturing of a critical mass of new national elite grounded on purposeful and 
professional leadership in politics and administration. This new corps of patriotic 
leaders would be delineated by their conscientious and purposeful attitude to service as 
a Levitical vocation. The best way to manufacture this new generation of national 
leaders would be to achieve a deep reform of the system of incentives and reward in the 
national economy.  
 
Conclusion: From here to there 
The democratic experiment in Africa has a long way to go. For now, the raging debate concerns 
both its viability in terms of cost and the possibility it has to engender development. Democratic 
governance requires institutional renewal, administrative reforms and development reflection and 
planning that would transcend the perennial problem of implementation and corruption. All these 
require a fundamental political will and commitment to national progress.  
I sincerely hope this conference would, in the final analysis, evolve a practical development 
blueprint with practical policy lesson potent and sufficient enough to get us from where we are 
presently to where we need to be. We have the vision; we only need the machinery to commence 
the journey.  
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